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I. INTRODUCTION
1) Background
The most prominent industrial sector in the Japanese economy is the
manufacturing sector (1). However, in recent years this sector has not been
witnessing the phenomenal growth which led to the attention given by re·
searchers all over the world to the Japanese economy in the late 1970's
through to the 1980's. The focus of research on the manufacturing sector be-
tween the late 1970's and the 1980's was on the internationalization aspects of
the industry. This included research on the internationalization of business
and marketing strategies of companies engaged in sector among others (2).
However, interest in the industrialization of Japan which underlie the devel-
opment of the manufacturing sector can be traced to research works in the
1960's (3). In recent years, the trend of international research on issues re-
lated to industrialization has been focused on the Newly Industrialized Econo-
mies and the developing countries.
However, research on matters related to industrialization ought to
viewed as a continual process involving especially the unfolding processes of
the manufacturing sector of an economy. Under such circumstances, research
in marketing becomes an indispensable aspect of research concerning the de-
velopment of the manufacturing industry. The main task of marketing re-
search in this respect is to look at the development of systems through which
products and services of a companies are designed to meet the needs of the
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customer or consumer in the achievement of the company's objectives. As a
result, marketing must effectively and efficiently meet the needs of both the
consumer/ customer and the manufacturer.
2) The Aim of this Paper
The objective of this paper is to revisit issue of the industrialization of
Japan by looking at the strategic development of the manufacturing industry.
This approach will be used to look at the reasons which have led to the
strength of the manufacturing sector in the Japanese economy. As an inte-
gral part of the presentations of the development of the manufacturing sector,
the nature of entrepreneurship in Japan, the reasons for the international
strategy of most Japanese firms, the reasons for the present stage of the
manufacturing sector and the future of this sector in the Japanese economy
will be presented. These factors are presented with the aim of analyzing the
direction of development of the manufacture industry and the impact of mar·
keting, including international marketing, on the growth of this sector.
3) The Development of this Paper
As indicated above, the focus of research and studies on the development
of the Japanese manufacturing industry has been on the period after World
War II. However, it should be noted that development is a continuous proc-
ess which is conditioned by some basic factors. These basic factors may start
from a remote point in time. In this respect, first, this paper looks at the gen-
erally postulated stages of growth of the manufacturing industry. Secondly,
the factors which fostered the development of the manufacturing sector be-
fore and after World War II are reviewed. Thirdly, the process of nurturing
the manufacturing sector is considered. The main concern of this paper is to
look into the nature of the major factors and issues which dictated the
growth of the manufacturing industry before and after World War n. A
comparison is undertaken as a means of identifying common, different and
unique characteristics of each of these two periods with respect to the direc-
tion of marketing as a major determinant of the growth of the manufacturing
sector.
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n. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN JAPAN
(1) The Stages of Growth of the Manufacturing Industry
Presenting some form of stages in industrial or economIC development
has been one the common approach to research related to the development of
industries, or an economy. Consequently, it is not surprising that attempts
have been made to demarcate stages of development of the manufacturing in-
dustry in Japan. One of the most commonly referred to approaches divides
the development of the manufacturing industry of Japan into roughly three
phases (5). Another common approach has been to focus on the period of
reign of various Emperors who have ascended to the throne of Japan (6). On
the other hand, a writer like G. C. AlIen has contended that each country pre-
sents a unique form of development (7). Therefore AlIen presents no system-
atic stages which follow some form of theory of the development of manufac-
turing industries or industrial development in general.
In this paper, the focus of attention is from the period when the Meiji Era
started to lay a strong foundation for heavy industries, shipping and foreign
investment, through to the World War II and then after. The period before
1880 did not see any significant development in the manufacturing sector in
Japan. It is important to note that the developments of the manufacturing in-
dustry before the World War II and immediately after reveal a systematic
pattern. Marketing activities were developed to support the industry.
2) The Nature Of The Manufacturing Sector Before World War II
A look at the stages of development of the Japanese economy before
World War II do not show uniform characteristics and strength of the vari-
ous industries within the manufacturing industry. The strength of the manu-
facturing sector from the latter part of the last century and the early twenti-
eth century was in the raw silk and the textile industry. In the late 1890's, Ja-
pan produced only 40% of the iron the country needed. The rest of the de-
mand for iron was met through the importation of cheap iron from the West.
Basically, all the steel demand was satisfied through importation. The
Yawata Iron Works established in 1901 by the State of Japan led the way for
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private investment in the iron and steel industry. By 1913, Japan was produc-
ing 48% of the pig iron and 34% of steel for home consumption. This means
that by the beginning of World War I, Japan was still dependent on im-
ported steel and iron. Coal mining was rather an important industry in espe-
cially Kyushu. Power production increased significantly during this period.
The shipbuilding Encouragement Act of 1896 fostered the manufacture of
ships in Japan. However compared to the West, by 1914 shipbuilding was
still not impressive. The focus of the development of the manufacturing sec-
tor before World War I was the government, supported by some few large
family business concerns called the "Zaibatsu" (The literal meaning of
Zaibatsu is "money-cliques". Zaibatsus were business houses which had great
interest in all forms of business) The government was also heavily involved in
providing transportation facilities for the development of the manufacturing
sector.
The wars fought during of this period had impact on the development of
the manufacturing sector. The major wars which accelerated the develop-
ment of manufacturing in Japan during this period were the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japan of 1904-5. The effect of these wars on
manufacturing can be seen in two main areas. First, the rapid advancement
of subsidies to support to manufacturing industries. Second is the govern-
ment initiative to buy products of companies in the manufacturing sector, in-
cluding the purchase of ships for military use to sustain production. After the
end of the wars, these ships were used to open new routes as well as to estab-
lish new companies. Examples are the enactment of the Navigation Subsidy
Act of 1896. Under this act, the Japanese government granted one million
yen per annum to Japanese ship owners operating ships with a capacity of
1,000 tons. This act which was amended in 1899 led to arise in the subsidy to
about six million between 1899 and 1900.
Regarding shipbuilding, the Japanese yards had launched only one steam-
ship of a capacity of over 1,000 tons before 1895. The Shipbuilding Act of
1896 aimed at having a positive impact on the building of ships of 1000 tons
or more. Under the 1896 Act, government subsidies were granted to builders
of vessels which exceeded 700 gross tons. The rates of subsidies given were
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12 yen per ton of ship which were below 1,000 tons and 20 yen per ton for
ships above 1,000 tons. Marine engines manufactured in Japan were granted
5 yen for every horse-power. The combined effect of these Acts led to the
rapid increase in ships as can be seen from the table which follows.
Table 1. MERCHANTILE MARINE
PERIOD
1873
1894
1904
1913
VESSELS
Steamships in thousand Gross Tons
26
169
797
1,514
Sailing Ships
(in thousand tons)
8
45
327
828
Source : Adapted from C. C. Allen p.92
World War I gave a different angle of impetus to the development of
manufacturing of Japan. Japanese manufacturers received orders to meet the
demand for munitions from by the governments of Allied Forces. This was
due to the fact that former munitions contract could not meet the demand.
The role of the Zaibatsus increased drastically. There was a significant
growth in the proportion of finished manufactured goods in the total export
of Japan. While in 1913 manufactured goods accounted for 29% of the export
of Japan, by 1929 the figure had rose up to 44% (8). Although there exist
scanty data on the growth of the manufacturing sector during the period, fig-
ures provided by G. C. AlIen (9) and W. W. Lockwood (10) indicate a rapid
expansion of the industry. At this point the textile industry did not only func-
tion as an exporter earner, but also it was purposely developed to respond to
Japan's export to meet military demand of the Allied Countries.
The content of the development of the manufacturing industry as a whole
and the relative importance of the various industries within the manufactur-
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ing sector, did not change much before the World Depression. The composi-
tion of the industry of Japan started to change after the World Depression.
See table the below.
Table 2 INDICES INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1930-1969
AREAS
All Industries
Utilities
Mining
Manufacturing
Food
Textiles
Ferrous metals
Machinery
Chemicals
Ceramics
Paper and pulp
PERIOD
1930
22
15
50
21
54
46
9
10
11
25
18
1937
38
27
78
37
64
85
25
15
31
37
26
1955
47
55
78
46
77
62
44
29
50
51
53
1965
174
166
106
177
34
147
178
199
208
160
153
1969
321
259
111
331
173
205
361
471
374
252
237
Source : Selected from G. C. Allen p.113
Noteworthy are the comparatively sharp fall in textiles as against the in-
crease in metals, chemicals and engineering areas before the 1970's which saw
the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy. G. C. AlIen has shown that
there was a substantial increase in explosives among others in the chemical
industry(ll}. One of the most remarkable feature of the period between 1930
and World War II was the attempt made to achieve improvement in the qual-
ity of products of the manufacturing industry, Much of the national expendi-
ture in the early period after the World Depression was determined by mili-
tary needs. The allocation of total expenditure which went to the Army and
Navy increased from 31% in 1932/32 to 47% for 1936/37. In other to main-
tain an effective army, not only was it necessary to provide the military with
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their needs but also military supplies were to be of high quality. The idea of
meeting military needs with domestically produced products meant that all
effort had to be made to produce products of high quality in Japan. An at-
tempt by the then Finance Minister Mr. K. Takahashi to cut back on expen-
diture allocated to the military in 1936 caused his assassination by the mili-
tary in the revolt of February 1936. By 1937, it had become obvious that in-
vestment and development in the armament industries was relatively high
(12). This had been achieved at the expense of the production of consumer
products/goods and even in respect of Japan's trend in export trade. Japan
was at this point prepared for World War II. It can therefore be contended
that the indirect and direct involvement in wars by Japan before World War
II played significant role in the development of the manufacturing industry in
Japan.
3) Marketing in the Development of the Manufacturing Industry Before
World War II
It is clear from the presentations made above that the Japanese Govern-
ment played a major role in the form of being the main consumer the prod-
ucts of the major manufacturing industries before World War II. During the
Meiji Era, the government acted as the main entrepreneur, marketer and con-
sumer of the manufacturing sector. This means that the government did not
only provide a major proportion of the financial/monetary aspects of the de-
velopment of manufacturing by undertaking direct investment and support
through subsides but also provided markets and initiated the development of
markets for manufactured products. However, after 1880 the sale of some
sectors of the manufacturing industry by the government reduced consider-
ably the direct participation in the marketing of products of the manufactur-
ing industry. The involvement of the government in the manufacturing indus-
try combined with it role in the three areas of entrepreneurship, marketing
and consumption later moved to the continent of Asia and the Japanese colo-
nies. For example, the presence of Mitsui Bussan in China can be seen in the
establishment of the Shanghai Cotton Manufacturing Ltd. in 1902. In 1909,
Nihon Menka which later became Nichimen Jitsugyo and now Nichimen Co.
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Ltd. opened a spinning plant in Shanghai. Okuragumi (later Okura Shoji)
also formed a joint venture with the Shenyang local government. This joint
venture led to the establishment of the Benxihu Coal and Iron Co. (initially
known as the Benxihu Coal Mining Co.) in 1910. This period of export of
capital can be seen as the beginning of international marketing involving
Japanese establishments. International marketing which was an integral part
of foreign trade which took various forms.
At the beginning of the development of manufacturing before World War
II, there was very little knowledge about foreign trade. Japan had been
forced to open the country to the outside world around 1858. That is, getting
to the end of the Tokugawa Era, after over 200 years of self-imposed isola-
tion (13). The signing of treaties with the United States and Britain to initi-
ate the opening of Japan to the outside world, led to the establishment of the
ports of Kanagawa (Yokohama), Nagasaki and Hakodate. This can be seen
as the first step in the development of international physical system to meet
international marketing needs. International marketing involved the market-
ing of raw material in exchange for the importation of manufactured prod-
ucts. Japan having very little knowledge of foreign trade if any, led to for-
eign merchants monopolizing foreign trade and consequently any form of in-
ternational marketing. The national campaigns against the monopoly of
overseas trade by foreign trading houses led to such monoplies being abol-
ished in 1899. However the system continued throughout the Meiji and the
Taisho period (1868 to 1926). Moreover, the export of cotton fabric to China
and Korea can be seen as a major step in international marketing by Japa-
nese establishments. By 1909, export of cotton fabric had surpassed that of
import of cotton and related products.
The development of manufacturing activities in the area of heavy and
chemical industries led to greater developments in international marketing.
This gave a new direction to trading companies which formed the backbone
of international marketing activities. By 1932, the export of steel had sur-
passed import. With laws passed linking foreign exchange allocation to ex-
port, both the Zaibatsus and trading companies increased their involvement in
foreign trade and international marketing. Linking foreign reserve allocation
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with performance in export as export promotion drive, also resulted in
greater involvement of manufacturers in the developments in international
marketing and foreign trade in 1939 and 1940 (14).
It is evident that the Japanese government was to a large extent involved
directly in the development of marketing to support the development of the
manufacturing sector. However, the most successful and prominent institu-
tion in the development of marketing to support the manufacturing sector of
Japan before World War II were the Zaibatsus. The main Zaibatsus were the
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. By the 1920's they formed the
core of the entrepreneurship for the manufacturing industries in addition to
the development of marketing companies in and outside Japan. As the Meiji
Government turned to the westernization of Japan, it faced the problem of
the lack of a large middle class and financial resources to carry out its poli-
cies. The bureaucracy provided policies objectives but had no resources to
implement them. In Japan existed few business families, that is Zaibatsus,
which for years had been involved in relatively large scale banking and com-
mence. They were mainly agents of the "daimyo" in the organization and
management of revenue. It is obvious that the government of the Meiji Era
turned to them to finance its programs and policies. They were also made to
be involved in the launching of new manufacturing industries and other enter-
prises. Some of these Zaibatsu had employed "samurai" who used the charac-
ter of a samurai to gain economic power in their areas of operation(15).
At the initial stages of their operations, the Zaibatsus tended to establish
close relationship with specific statesmen. The financial and political assis-
tance which the Zaibatsus offered led to some opportunities to purchase state
properties at relatively lower prices. Zaibatsus also earned huge profit from
underwriting the Japanese Government loans. Sometimes, a Zaibatsu had to
reluctantly purchase State property as proposed by affiliated statesmen. The
peak of the power of the Zaibatsus as the manufacturers and marketers of Ja-
pan was reached around 1929. Many small Zaibatsus died after the post
World War I period and the militarism which followed. There existed some
large business concerns like Okura in the trade, mining and textile industries.
Furukawa which was in electric plant, mining and refining but not a Zaibat-
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sus was also a core in the combination of manufacturing and marketing ac-
tivities since it had an integrated economic structure. However, the Zaibatsus
formed the foundation of manufacturing and marketing, especially those in-
dustries related to the military, of which their remnants still control.
Ill. THE CHALLENGES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING
SECTOR IN JAPAN AFTER WORLD WAR II
1) The Development of the Manufacturing Industry During the Occupation
The defeat of Japan by the Allied Forces led to the occupation of the
country by the Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers (SCAP). In the-
ory, this Occupational Force was a consortium of this Western allies during
World War II. However, in practice the task of the Occupational Force was
left to the United States of America. Japan had never experienced an inva-
sion in its history. The occupation of this country by the United States of
America from 1945 to 1952 resulted in a dynamic turn of events in the devel-
opment of the manufacturing industry of the country. Since the forces behind
the development of the manufacturing sector before World War II were in
the military related manufacturing establishments, in physical terms, the
manufacturing sector was almost completely destroyed by the War.
The physical destruction of the manufacturing sector of Japan can be en-
visaged from events which took place before Japan accepted defeat. One of
such events was the establishment of the Postwar Programs Committee
(PWC) by the State Department of the United States in January 1944 (16). Ac-
cording to Takehiko Kinumoto, as early as November 1945, the Potsdam
Declaration prepared by the United States, Britain and China (later joined by
the Soviet Union in August) contained a statement concerning ending the
War to spare Japan of damages. The statement had an expression which
stated that the three countries had conferred and agreed that Japan should be
given the opportunity to end the war without causing damage to the country
(17). This Declaration was supposed to have been proposed to Japan before
the atomic bombs were dropped. A number of documents, reports and orders
show that after the end of World War II, systematic attempts were made to
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demilitarize the manufacturing sector. The plans proposed that the manufac-
turing sector should be turned into consumer goods oriented industry (18).
Consequently, the economic recovery of Japan on the whole, and especially
the development of the manufacturing sector, after the end of World War II
was strongly influenced by the United States of America since as stated ear-
lier, the United Sates was the country which represented the Allied Forces in
Japan.
The resurgent Japanese manufacturing industry received big and lucra-
tive orders from the American Forces during the Korean War fought between
1950 and 1953. The same occurred during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and
1970s. As a junior partner in an alliance with the USA, the manufacturing in-
dustry of Japan benefited from the military presence of United States in East
Asia. The systematic demilitarization of Japan led to a focus on the manufac-
ture of consumer goods. This special relationship Japan had with the United
Sates does not only to a large extent explain the significant growth of the
manufacturing industry in particular, but also the economy as a whole. Ja-
pan had to be self sufficient in the production of its products including manu-
factured products. The structure of the administration established by the Al-
lied Forces made Japanese government directly responsible for its people. It
was made clear that for the $2 billion which the United Sates put into the de-
velopment the economy of Japan between 1946 and 1951, Japan had to pay $4
billion during the same period in the form of cost of the SCAP occupation
(19). Since Japan had to meet such an obligation, the sharp growth of the
economy cannot be attributed only to just the demilitarization processes
which affected the manufacturing sector but also other elements. As had
been the past experience in Japan, by relying on Zaibatsus for the develc,p-
ment of Japan, the business sector became the engine of growth through a
strategic development of the manufacturing sector by using and implementing
marketing activities to support the growth of the manufacturing sector.
2) The Strategic Development of the Manufacturing Industry After the Occupation
Unlike the period before World War II, the tendency of the Japanese
Government to be strongly involved in direct investment reduced in relative
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terms. The private sector had to assume responsibility of reviving the ruined
manufacturing industry. The focus of attention was to turn military produc-
tion facilities into the production of goods for the consumer market. Conse-
quently, the marketability of products in the consumer market became the
core of the strategic development of the manufacturing industry. Japan had
to turn overseas once again since domestic experience in the area of the de-
velopment and marketing of consumer products was not sufficient. Much of
the international marketing and foreign trade knowledge which had been ac-
quired in the 1920s had been lost over time.
Before the War and the period of occupation by the Allied Forces, the re-
lationship of the business sector with Europe was very strong. Most of the
products and technology used in Japan therefore came from Europe. How-
ever, with the United States being the main force and the center of activities
of the SCAP, the business sector had to look for a new driving force to power
the development of the manufacturing sector from the United States of Amer-
ica. That is the stage at which marketing became the main force behind the
development of the manufacturing sector after the Occupation. The element
of marketing which was first used was product strategy. This was especially
with reference to the use of the concept of product life cycle (PLC).
The products which formed the basis of the establishment of manufactur-
ing industries became important in determining the strategic development of
the industry, and in a particular country as a whole. These products were of
primary importance in determining the strength of the industry and its poten-
tial growth. According to Professor Yosuke Kinugasa, a country is said to be
at the "starting point" of a product life cycle if it is the country in which a
company first developed, produced and marketed a particular product on a
large scale. It is assumed here that the said product may not necessarily have
been invented in that country. However, "commercial life cycle" through the
production and marketing of the product on relative large scale should be un-
dertaken by a company with legally domicile in that country. Kinugasa has
grouped most consumer products which formed the basis of the development
of the manufacturing sector of Japan as originating from three main coun-
tries/areas (20).
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Figure 1 The Nature of The Condition Under
Which Production was located
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(1) The first are products whose PLC originated in the United Sates. These
products include home electric appliances, computers and automobiles.
Kinugasa looked at the route of mass production of automobile and
placed it within the products whose life cycle commenced in the United
States.
(2) The second group of products are whose PLC originated in Europe. For
example watches, clocks and cameras.
(3) The third group of products are those whose PLC started in Japan. Exam-
ples of such products are soybeans sauce, and "instant noodles".
It is clear that most of the products which supported the development of
the Japanese manufacturing sector like automobiles, home electronic applica-
tions and personal computers among others, originated in a countries other
than Japan. According Kinugasa, the strategic development of the Japanese
manufacturing industry was based on technology transfer. The nature, con-
duct of the transfer of technology was based on marketing, especially interna-
tional marketing considerations.
3) The Environment Under which Technology Transfer and Location of
Production were Conducted.
The contention that the Japanese market is a closed one can be attrib-
uted to the conditions under which manufacturing industry, especially produc-
tion and also marketing were developed. Kinugasa calls this the "invisible
hand". This "hand" was moved by three main agents. Namely the govern-
ment, bureaucracy and the business community. See next Figure 1. The gov-
ernment introduced laws to restrict the importation of finished consumer
products and direct investment by foreign companies. The bureaucracy es-
tablished regulation to enforce these law. The business provided financial
support to the ruling party which has been in office for almost the entire pe-
riod after the war. The business sector sat on almost all committees of the
government with the bureaucrats. In certain areas, retired bureaucrats were
entice to work for some companies. This process created a relationship
which left out the consumer. In the long run, the consumer came to accept a
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situation under which it was generally assumed that the actions of the "iron
triangle" were in the interest of the consumer.
Given this situation, the Japanese companies imported technology. Japa-
nese banks provided the financial needs of the manufacturing companies. In
certain situations, the government supported the manufacturing industry by
providing grants and subsidies. With the passage of time, the Japanese com-
panies did not only produce for the Japanese market, but also for oversea
markets. The next stage was to take full control of the production life cycle
of the products they dealt in and to establish production facilities in the other
advanced countries, NIES and even in developing countries.
4) The Place of Marketing in Mechanism for the Strategic Development
of Manufacturing Industry
The mechanism and path taken in the development of the manufacturing
industries is given shown in Figure 2. It is based on the earlier presentations
made concerning the origin of the PLC of a specific product as proposed by
Kinugasa. The box named 1 indicates the importation/imitation of technol-
ogy by Japanese firms. The imported technologies were in relationship to the
means of production or concerning marketability of products. In other to
minimize the cost of technology with respect to the time spent to assimilate
such a technology and the risk involved, Japanese companies went for tech-
nologies of standardized products. This stategy leads to box 2. Such prod-
ucts had achieved a certain level of certainty with respect to technology and
product characteristics based on their position in the product life cycle. The
core competitiveness of these products is pricing. With pricing being the
main factor, it became profitable for Japanese companies to manufacture
such products in Japan. As presented in box 3, the advantages of producing
these products in Japan were further strengthened by three main other fac-
tors. The first factor being the availability of skilled but cheap labor to
manufacture these products in Japan. The second factor was that at the be-
ginning of the manufacture of these products, the Japanese companies pro-
duced them for both the domestic market and the overseas markets at almost
the same time. The domestic market was being controlled through the iron
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triangle. The oversea market was guaranteed as a result Japanese position
after the War and also its relationship with Allied Forces, especially the
United States of America. The third major factor was that the Japanese yen
seemed to be over-valued against the American dollar. The productions for
the oversea market therefore became very lucrative. Another major factor
which assisted in the development of the manufacturing industry is listed in
box 4. This box forms one of the main pillars of the strategy adopted by the
Japanese companies in the manufacturing industry. That is, to go for prod-
ucts whose marketability had been established by US companies and are also
known to a large extent all over the world.
The next factor was the different marketing approaches adopted in deal-
ing with the domestic and foreign markets. With regulation and restriction
set for the Japanese market, the entry of foreign products became difficult.
Most of these products which had achieved high market penetrations in
Europe and the United States were being consumed in only a small segment
of the national market. Consequently, a large proportion of consumers per-
ceived them as new products. The restriction also led to monopoly of the
market by Japanese firms who were able to control and stabilize prices on
the domestic market. The development of the domestic market and market-
ing activities were undertaken by the manufacturing companies. Foreign
markets easily accepted these Japanese product because they were already
known to consumers and pricing had become the main factor of marketing.
Since production cost was lower for the Japanese companies, they continued
to expand their market share through various forms of pricing strategies.
Sogo Shosha, that is general trading companies, were in-charge of the con-
duct of international marketing. This was a heritage from the pre World
War II period. The new manufacturing companies had to rely on these gen-
eral trading companies for various reasons. These reasons included the fact
that the remnants of the Zaibatsu system still carried out the division of busi-
ness functions under which trading companies were in-charge of overseas
business. Another reason was that the newly established manufacturing com-
panies did not possess the business resources (human, facilities, financial and
information) to carry out international marketing. Even where such business
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resources were available, from the point of VIew of pnCIng policies and
strategies, it was rather profitable to use the general trading companies.
Another major pillar of this strategy is presented in box 6. Japanese
companies did not only produce products in the form as they were in the
United States and Europe but the companies embanked upon a drive to con-
duct research and development of these products. The research and develop-
ment conducted were in the form of applied research and innovation research
to improve upon the function of such products. These research activities cov-
ered both production techniques and the products themselves. Most of the
products which resulted from these research and development drive and ac-
tivities came out as new products meant for the United States and European
markets where the PLC of these products may have began. One other area of
research and development was in quality control. This led to the introduction
of a new form of quality control through what has been termed as quality
control circles. Equipped with knowledge to deal with products and technol-
ogy attempts were made to produce products which were not standardized.
That is, products in the early stages of their life cycle. This increased the
added-valued to the products and technology related to their production. The
result was high quality products which showed Japanese originality. These
product possessed comparatively higher qualities than the same products on
the market international market. The products were sold at relatively higher
prices since at this point the Japanese companies had achieved control over
the product life cycle of these products. There was some form of control and
flexibility in setting the prices of these products. The companies in the manu-
facturing sector were able to employ more efficient means of production.
This led to an increase in labor productivity as well as better product qual-
ity. At this point, the manufacturing companies had reached a position to un-
dertake the international marketing of their products. The major determi-
nant factor was flexibility in pricing policies and strategies.
It can be concluded that the strategic development of the manufacturing
industry after World War II therefore rested on two main areas. First, the
employment of concepts in marketing, especially the characteristics of the
PLC. Secondly, the effective implementation of marketing strategies. The
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stable socio - political environment was conducive for a stable development
of an industry (manufacturing mainly for a consumer market) in which Japan
was a late corner. Furthermore, from the perspective of the manufacturing
industry as a whole, that Japan had to start afresh from the beginning as a
result of the defeat suffered during World War 11. However, it is also impor-
tant to mention briefly some other factors which promoted such a develop-
ment process other than the core marketing factors supported by socio-
political factors.
These factors include first, educational policies from the Meiji Era. The
education policies facilitated the communication and diffusion of new ideas
and technical methods. Throughout the Meiji Era as the Zaibatsus provided
finances for industrial development, the local governments were able to invest
a third of their expenditure in education. Secondly, the government and other
institutions employed a considerable number of foreign technicians and man-
agers to train Japanese. The government therefore put in a lot of effort into
an educational system under which Japanese can read and understand a sec-
ond foreign language (especially English). It was not only the government
which initiated this strong desire to educated the society, but also business
leaders were enthusiastic advocates. Thirdly, it is remarkable to note the ex-
tent to which strong incorporation of Western model technology ideas and
values have been injected into the education system. The focus was on ideas
from Europe before the World Wars and later this shifted to the United
States of America after the World War 11. Thirdly, strong morals were in-
itially implanted in the social structure through Confucianism. However, un-
like other areas in Asia where Confucian training was unsympathetic to sci-
entific method, the intellectual elites who where in the bureaucracy, govern-
ment and business were able to offset such a tendency. Lastly, the nature of
entrepreneurship which occurred during the Meiji Era continued at almost the
same momentum through to the period after World War 11. This led to many
people ceasing the opportunities of technology assimilation at various periods
in the history of Japan. Consequently, although the Japanese society respect
hierarchy, it has admitted flexible in accepting movement within the business
society. This situation should not be confused with the issue of seniority sys-
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tern of promotion within a specific company,
N. CONCLUSION
It seems that currently, the high growth of the manufacturing industry of
Japan from the 1960's to the 1980's has settle for minimal growth. One of the
main reasons is that the PLC strategy has lost its power at this level of devel-
opment of Japan. The ability to conduct basic research which rests on
"seeds" has not matched the rate of growth at which Japan has exhausted the
application of the PLC model for developing manufacturing industry. Inter-
nationalization of the society has relatively diffused the old strong nationalis-
tic feeling and vestment against foreign presence. Japan has maintained an
economy based on manufacturing sector because although other advanced
countries easily gave up on products in the maturity stage, Japan is not doing
so. Japan has incorporated other countries as it tries to control the PLC of
products which supported the growth of its manufacturing industry. This in-
cludes the full and partial distribution of the production facilities by Japan
companies overseas through direct investment in the opposite direction of the
location of manufacturing centers. This is in addition to establishing manu-
facturing facilities in the NIES and some developing countries. All these ac-
tivities are being highly dictated by marketing factors, especially from the
perspective of international marketing.
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